Toma nota.../Take note...

En una charla del programa televisivo Democracy at Work sobre el tema "The cure for Capitalism", Richard D. Wolff, un conocido economista marxista de la Universidad de Massachusetts, basado en las teorías vertidas por él en su libro del mismo nombre, sugería a los sindicatos norteamericanos que en lugar de dejarse "chantajear" por las empresas poderosas que amenazan con trasladar sus fábricas y servicios a otros países con mano de obra barata, si los sindicatos se negaran a aceptar contratos con beneficios menores y salarios más bajos, podrían anular la amenaza con el argumento de que el sindicato organizaría entonces a los obreros y empleados de la empresa en una cooperativa que continuara fabricando el mismo producto o brindando los mismos servicios a precios más bajos que los anteriores.

Esta estrategia obligaría a recapacitar a la empresa que amenaza con trasladar sus empleos al extranjero (outsourcing) porque la cooperativa rival que surgiría en la plaza que abandona eliminaría la necesidad de mantener un alto margen de utilidades para satisfacer las exigencias de los accionistas. Los cooperativistas seguirían recibiendo los mismos salarios y beneficios que antes y la "plusvalía" que antes beneficiaba a los empresarios e inversionistas se aplicaría a rebajar los precios. En otras palabras, que la empresa se enfrentaría a una fuerte competencia ubicada en el mismo mercado que amenaza abandonar como empleador pero pretende conservar como proveedor.

Esto implica una improbable vigencia del desgastado concepto del "hombre nuevo", por el cual los empleados convertidos en cooperativistas no presionarían por mayores salarios y beneficios, ahora que ellos son los dueños, sino que procederían buenamente a bajar los precios.

El cooperativismo es muy útil y beneficioso en cualquier sociedad, pero no es el remedio para conservar empleos en un país frente a la competencia de mano de obra barata en otros países.

Francis Fukuyama ha vuelto a despertar el debate con sus arriesgadas y controversiales opiniones, pero esta vez no es sobre el "fin de la historia" sino sobre la historia evolutiva de la democracia.

Se pregunta en un artículo publicado en Current History si hay una secuencia apropiada o lógica en las transiciones democráticas. ¡Y la hay! Pero la vemos a posteriori. Las circunstancias, la idiosincracia, los antecedentes históricos y otros factores impiden establecer una norma definida y, mucho menos, una que permita prededir presentes o futuros.

La incognita que plantea Fukuyama es si la democracia surge como consecuencia de reformas que liberalizan la economía y permiten a la sociedad progresar en un ambiente menos autoritario o si el meollo que conduce a la transición es la implantación de un Estado de derecho donde imperen la ley y el orden, aun cuando sus disposiciones no permitan todavía una libre manifestación democrática.

Evidentemente, está mal planteada la incógnita porque ninguna de estas alternativas basta para propiciar la democracia.  El meollo de la cuestión está en el nivel cultural de la sociedad afectada por el autoritarismo y en la influencia que su cultura tiene en las nuevas generaciones dispuestas a avanzar hacia sistemas más respetuosos de los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos.

Este es un proceso generacional que puede tomar décadas o incluso siglos, porque aunque la estructura democrática es perfectible, no puede mantenerse en pie si le fallan los cimientos. Estos son el Estado de derecho y la Democracia Participativa. En realidad no puede defenderse el derecho sin una eficaz participación democrática.

Ni el modelo chino conduce a la democracia ni tampoco el simple ejercicio electoral que se implante para justificar una falsa legitimidad en el ejercicio del poder, como en Rusia, Irán o Venezuela..

The Economist introduced a book review titled "The subversive chancellor"  on pages dedicated to reports on European policy to make a veiled criticism on Angela Merkel's performance as Chancellor of Germany, based on the newly published work "Die Patin" ("The Godmother", not yet translated into English), written by Gerturd Höhler, an influential conservative, a former adviser to Helmut Köhl and a frequent presence in the German media.

In its veiled approach, The Economist disagrees on a few points presented by Ms Höhler, who paints Chancellor Merkel with the colors of a power-obsessed egomaniac threatening the foundations of democracy as result of her upbringing in Communist East Germany. Accordingly, she describes the Merkel's governing style as "establishing a quiet variation of authoritarian power". But The Economist appears to be aggreable to her other arguments highlighting what the magazine perceives as Ms Merkel's lack of solid values, her political ambition and her avoidance "to be committed to anything" at all.

To substantiate this view of the Christian Democratic Chancellor, they point out that she has always been malleable to adopt ideas from others as her own for political expediency, "such as family policy from the SPD or exit from nuclear energy from the Greens". Precisely a governing style quite contrary to the "quiet variation of authoritarian power" argued in "The Godmother".

At the beginning of the present US financial crisis, Chrysler declared bankruptcy. Chrysler, like GM, was in dire financial straits and the federal government graciously offered to "buy the companies" and keep them out of bankruptcy to "save jobs." Chrysler, as well as GM, were, in the words of President Obama and his Administration, "Too big to fail".

By the late 1970's Chrysler had a much bigger share of the market than now, but it was bankrupt as well. However, the US government did not intervene directly, as it did in 2009. At that time, Chrysler followed the natural course of any failing corporation and had to choose whether to give-up and close its doors or reorganize. In 1978 Lee Iacocca was brought in as CEO. Iacocca approached Congress on September 7, 1979 and asked for US$1.5 billion in loan guarantees. Congress reluctantly passed the "Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979" (Public Law 96-185) on December 20, 1979, prodded by Chrysler workers and dealers in every congressional district who feared the loss of their livelihoods. Chrysler not only made a come-back on following years but eventually paid this debt.

However, in 2008/2009, decisions taken by the government were quite different. On December 19, Pres. Bush announced a rescue loan, but the general "auto bailout" proposed was rejected in the Senate. A few months later the Feds organized their own "Automotive Task Force" to "fix" Chrysler and GM. President Obama appointed Steve Rattner, a longtime Wall Street deal maker, to be the White House's official "Car Czar" - literally, that was his title. Rattner was empowered as the liaison between Obama and Chrysler and GM. But in order to simplify, we'll concentrate on the Chrysler story.

Readers may wonder what is a Czar. The term "czar" emerges when President Woodrow Wilson appointed financier Bernard Baruch to run the War Industries Board in 1917. This position was dubbed then the "industry czar" and evolved to be known as the "war czar" after World War II. "Czar" became a slang term for certain high-level civil servants, such as the "drug czar" for the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the "terrorism czar" for a Presidential advisor on terrorism policy, the "cyber security czar" for the highest-ranking Department of Homeland Security official on computer security and information security policy, and the "war czar" to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. More specifically, a czar refers to a sub-cabinet level advisor within the Executive branch of the U.S. Government. The fact is that he or she is appointed at the Executive level. This keeps many appointees outside the required senatorial approval; they answer only to the President and their actions are not accountable to Congress.