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• La Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa (PACE) se reunió en Estrasburgo del 23 al 27 de junio.

Estrasburgo, Jun.30 (DPnet).- La situación actual en Ucrania, el retroceso de la democracia en Georgia y la protección de los abogados fueron algunos de los principales problemas que la Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa (APCE) debatió en 2025. PACE también discutió las dificultades de la migración y la importancia de las redes sociales para preservar la libertad de expresión. La Asamblea Parlamentaria del Consejo de Europa también aprobó un nuevo tratado para salvaguardar la profesión jurídica.

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Invasión de Rusia a Ucrania: 

El presidente Zelenskyy visitó el Consejo de Europa y habló ante la Asamblea sobre el conflicto en curso. PACE también discutió el tema de los civiles y prisioneros de guerra detenidos ilegalmente, así como la necesidad de detener la agresión rusa.

Reversión democrática en Georgia:

PACE discutió la observación de las elecciones en Georgia y instó al gobierno a implementar recomendaciones anteriores y restablecer la colaboración con el Consejo de Europa, al tiempo que denunciaba el rápido retroceso democrático de Georgia.

[Se muestran en el mapa los territorios invadidos por Rusia.]

Strasbourg, June 13 (DPnet).– The Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset will participate on June 20 in a flagship event of the New Democratic Pact for Europe advancing the Reykjavik Principles for Democracy — featuring dynamic team challenges, plenary debates on democratic resilience and free expression, and collaborative innovation to counter disinformation and revitalise democracy in the digital age.

The New Democratic Pact is conceived as a Commitment for 21st-Century Democratic Security in Europe, redefining democracy — making it stronger, more adaptable to old and new challenges, and more inclusive. By leveraging innovation, technology, and collective action, this initiative will empower people, reinforce democratic institutions, and drive democratic resilience. The Pact will highlight the importance of democratic security, safeguarding the values that form the foundation of our societies. 

The Council of Europe's strategy for strengthening democratic resilience in Europe rests on three key pillars:

This brief article will explain why the world’s banking system is unsound and what differentiates a sound bank from an unsound one. I suspect not one person in 1,000 actually understands the difference. As a result, the world’s economy is now based upon unsound banks dealing in unsound currencies. Both have undergone considerable degeneration from their origins.

Modern banking emerged from the goldsmithing trade of the Middle Ages. Being a goldsmith required a working inventory of precious metals, and managing that inventory profitably required expertise in buying, selling, and storing them securely. Those capacities segued easily into the business of lending and borrowing gold, which is to say the business of lending and borrowing money.

Most people today are only dimly aware that until the early 1930s, gold coins were used in everyday commerce by the general public. In addition, gold backed most national currencies at a fixed rate of convertibility. Banks were just another business—nothing special. They were distinguished from other enterprises only by the fact that they stored, lent, and borrowed gold coins, not as a sideline but as a primary business. Bankers had become goldsmiths without the hammers.

Bank deposits, until quite recently, fell strictly into two classes, depending on the preference of the depositor and the terms offered by banks: time deposits and demand deposits. Although the distinction between them has been lost in recent years, respecting the difference is a critical element of sound banking practice.

Vladimir Putin espoused irredentist and imperialist views challenging Ukraine's legitimacy as a state, declared that Russia wanted to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine and made irrational claims that the Ukrainian government was a group of neo-Nazis who were conducting genocide against the Russian minority in the Donbas.  Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, or the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in Ukraine are examples of territories where the Kremlin has usually chosen to create "frozen" or "managed" war.  Russia has tended to maintain a military presence through territorial occupation or support for separatist states, acting as a self-proclaimed “peacekeeper” to advance its interests in the regions and often imposing puppet leadership, rather than completely invading nations like Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan.

Russia's Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

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by  Marlène Laruelle

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, in the sense of a relatively consistent and coherent political project for Russia and aspirations to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires, and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. 

With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official orthodoxy. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology.

After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.