In the 1950s and early 1960s, a number of social scientists had a dim view of direct popular influence on public policies. 
These individuals had been alarmed by fascist and/or communist movements in Europe in the early decades of the 20th century which received widespread support from the working- and/or lower-middle-classes. During the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s, several movements in the United States, such as Huey Long’s Share Our Wealth program, Father Coughlin’s sizable radio audience, William Lemke’s Union Party, and, somewhat later, Joseph R. McCarthy’s supporters, also unnerved many of those already suspicious of grassroots populism.
Their notions crystallized into a body of thought that came to be known as “empirical democratic theory.” Although different writers focused on diverse topics, the theory had basically two commonalities: (1) proponents relied heavily on the then-recently developed practice of scientific public opinion polling; and (2) most of the empirically oriented theorists stressed the mass public’s political limitations. The empirical democratic theorists argued that public opinion polls from the 1930s to the 1950s overwhelmingly documented ordinary people’s passivity, political ignorance, and anti-civil-libertarian proclivities. Consequently, these theorists touted political elites’ critical role in maintaining democratic stability.
For a brief period, the empirical democratic theory held sway among some social scientists.
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me gusta la tendencia de un mundo que cada día se sumerge más en un profundo mar de deuda. Creo que estamos cayendo en el abuso e irresponsabilidad. No se está creando suficiente capital para sostener el crecimiento explosivo de esa deuda. A veces pienso que, si se pudiera hacer un experimento y congelar el tiempo, pasar luego a liquidar todos los activos de los bancos, no sería suficiente para pagar sus pasivos”.

Two things are striking about it. First, what the United States gets in return from the Castro regime is exactly and precisely nothing. This is not a bargained-for exchange; Castro makes no promises, allows no one to get out of prison, does not even make a vague allusion to reform. Nothing. This is because Cuba policy is, for the President, less an exercise in statesmanship than the true product of ideological politics. This policy is a remedy, a medicine, an apology, to make up for what he sees as decades of American sin toward Cuba.