Until a few years ago, the optimists reigned supreme. Liberal democracy, many argued, was the most just and attractive political regime. It had already triumphed in many of the most militarily dominant, economically advanced, and culturally influential countries in the world. In due course, others would surely follow suit.
The most prominent manifestation of this optimism was Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of 
the “end of history.” Writing a few months before the Berlin Wall fell, Fukuyama argued that humankind’s ideological evolution had come to an end. Although various twentieth-century political movements had promised to supersede Western liberalism, by the end of the century their impetus had been exhausted. Communism might still have “some isolated true believers” in such far-flung places as “Managua, Pyongyang, or Cambridge, Massachusetts,” but it was no longer a viable contender for ideological hegemony. Devoid of credible alternatives, the world was safe for liberal democracy: “The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.”
Many social scientists dismissed Fukuyama’s work out of hand. But the truth of the matter is that scholars who would never have deigned to make the bold pronouncements that turned Fukuyama into a worldwide celebrity were committed to equally far-reaching assumptions. Indeed, perhaps the most influential empirical article on the fate of democracy published since 1989 made a claim that, properly understood, was even more triumphalist. According to Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, countries that had changed governments through free and fair elections at least twice, and that had reached a level of annual per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975 (a figure that they gave as $6,055 “expressed in constant U.S. dollars computed at purchasing-power parities and expressed in 1985 prices,” or close to $14,500 in 2019 terms), were consolidated democracies. They could expect to enjoy life eternal. As Przeworski, Limongi, and two other colleagues had put it in an earlier article in the Journal of Democracy, at or above this level of per capita income, “democracy is certain to survive, come hell or high water.”
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Hace un par de años me invitaron a una entrevista en la estación de radio Univisión de Los Angeles. El tema era inmigración, pero, como había participación de los radioescuchas, se inició una avalancha de llamadas tratando de lincharme por mi posición defendiendo el retiro del gobierno de las actividades que, de forma natural, pertenecían a la iniciativa privada. Me impresionó una dama que me acusaba de aliado del capitalismo salvaje mexicano y al responderle que en Mexico nunca había existido el capitalismo, me rebatía esgrimiendo como ejemplos, a Azcárraga, Slim, Salinas Pliego etc. Al ver su furiosa reacción cuando le notifico que eso no era capitalismo, me di cuenta de la gran confusión que existe de lo que realmente es el capitalismo y el motivo de su mala reputación. A partir de esos momentos entendí por qué la gente, entre el paraíso o el infierno, escogen el infierno.
roads, bridges, and tunnels (including a connection between the West Bank and Gaza).