The Social Control methods of the Dominican Trujillos and the Cuban Castros

     “For somehow this is tyranny's disease, to trust no friends”―Aeschylus (“Prometheus Bound”)

                       OUTLINE

  1. Preamble
  2. Two Caribbean dictatorships: Dominican Republic and Cuba
  3. A preliminary typology of dictatorships (Authoritarian & Totalitarian)
  4. The Trujillos and the Castros:Eight salient parallels
  5. Other discussion points
  6. Conclusion, for now
  7. Resumen en Español
  8. Notes
  9. Additional bibliographic references
  10. About the author

 

I.          PREAMBLE(2)

    Dictatorships —and their foreign intellectual defenders— have traditionally been studied mostly by historians, politologists, sociologists, philosophers, and even novelists (e.g., Gann, 1985; Hamill, 1965; Hollander, 1997; P. Lewis, 2006; Turits, 2003; Vargas-LLosa, 2000; Wiarda, 1968).  Yet, as a specialist in Legal-Political Anthropology, I have been “fantasizing” about creating the sub-field of the “Anthropology of Dictatorships.”  The discipline’s eclectic comparative and field-based research techniques are distinctively equipped to examine dictatorships in a rather objective fashion.  Unfortunately, too many colleagues miss the point as they seem to romanticize some of these dreadful regimes, Socialist Cuba being the major example.(3)  Nonetheless, this essay is intended as a modest contribution toward the design of the Anthropology of Dictatorships. 

    My primary purpose here is twofold: (a) First, to outline —if barely— some of the most salient similarities vis-à-vis the methods of socio-political-economic control of two notorious insular Hispanic Caribbean dictatorships, one that fortunately disappeared in 1961, and the other that still lingers in existence.  (b) And second, to seek feedback from readers for the sake of improving my future analyses on this topic.

   

II.   A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY OF DICTATORSHIPS

    In simple operational terms, and although there are sub-categories according to variations, we can classify dictatorships into two major types for our purpose here:  

(A)Authoritarian: often intended (or pretending) to be of a relatively temporary duration, usually with a rather vague ideology, little mass mobilization, and limited interference in the economy.  

(B)Totalitarian: that aims to exercise absolute, centralized control over the country’s inhabitants; i.e., to virtually convert the whole country into what sociologists call a total institution <www.thefreedictionary. com/Totalitarian+dictators>.  

    Yet, some dictatorships, such as that of the Trujillos in the Dominican Republic (D.R.), have been routinely classified as authoritarian.  But, as I have been arguing in previous writings, upon close analysis the Trujillos’ dictatorship resembled more the totalitarian genre.  At the same time, certain so-called revolutionary regimes, such as that of the Castro family in Cuba, are too often portrayed in the media, academia and Hollywood as “liberating,” when au contraire, they belong in reality to the totalitarian genre. 

    This August 16, 2019 marked the 89th anniversary of Rafael Trujillo’s ascension to power in the D.R., though it was hardly noted even in the Dominican media.  This is all the more reason to take this occasion to highlight some key analogies of these two Latin-American dictatorships.

 III.   TWO ANTILLEAN DICTATORSHIPS: D.R. AND CUBA  Fidel Castro Ruz (izq) y Rafael Leónidas Trujillo (der)

     1.TheDominican Trujillos:  Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, widely considered the continent’s goriest dictator, was executed on May 30, 1961 by a band of his own associates ostensibly in cahoots with U.S. intelligence agents during President Kennedy’s Administration (Turits, 2003:260; Wiarda, 1968:170-73; Alum, 2019).  Thus ended the 31 years of the Trujillo family’s tormenting the Dominican people.  As cultural historian Derby (2009) indicates, the Trujillos’ despotism (1930-1961) had no precedence in the hemisphere prior to the Castros’ regime in neighboring Cuba [see section “H” below and Note 11 as to why I refer to the Trujillos and the Castros in plural]. 

     2. TheCuban Castros:  Masquerading as “humanist revolutionaries,” Fidel and Raúl Castro enjoyed great popular support upon reaching power in Cuba in 1959.  That popularity, however, soon vanished as the bearded brothers hijacked the originally liberal-inspired political revolt against the authoritarian dictatorship of retired general Fulgencio Batista.(4)  Instead of the promised restoration of the innovative 1940 Constitution, the Castro brothers turned the island-nation into a Soviet-style Orwellian dystopia (de la Cuesta & Alum, 1974).  The siblings purged their own pro-democratic rank-and-file, abolished freedom of the press and private property, destroyed the agricultural and industrial base, and essentially redistributed misery.  Moreover, as it has been documented, they created a “culture of poverty.”(5)  In fact, their detrimental policies prompted a mass exodus unprecedented in the Americas, only matched nowadays by that triggered by the so-called Bolivarian Revolution of the Chávez-Maduro regime that the Latinamericanists Portes & Armony (2018:162) properly call “disastrous” <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency. html>.

IV.    THE TRUJILLOS AND THE CASTROS--EIGHT SALIENT PARALLELS  

    Although foreign sympathizers of Socialist Cuba in the media, academia and Hollywood refuse to admit it —comfortably from abroad “with eyes wide shut”— there are revealing similarities between the Castros’ and the Trujillos’ methods of socio-political control; for example:

  (A)Rafael Trujillo (Oct. 24/1891-May 30/1961) was of a humble rural background who joined the military largely as a means to escape poverty.  In 1930 he reached his country’s presidency through scare tactics and vote manipulation.  Fidel Castro (Aug. 13/1926-Nov. 25/2016) also had rural roots, but his father was a Spaniard who had come to Cuba originally as a volunteer soldier in the cruel corps that fought against the patriotic independentist Cubans in the late 1890s.  With time, Ángel Castro became an extremely wealthy latifundia landlord who sent son Fidel to exclusive schools.  Eventually becoming a lawyer in Havana (though he hardly practiced the profession), young Castro was a civilian who joined those Cuban reformers who advocated in the 1950s that the soldiers should return “back to the barracks” (Hansen, 2019).  But both tyrants —equally bizarrely fascinated with Napoléonic uniforms— militarized their respective countries and made the military a privileged caste with immense control over economic activities.  Trujillo was ridiculously fond of military medals (he was mockingly called “Chapitas,” i.e., bottlecaps).  Castro loved military parades showcasing Soviet materiel and literally brought the world to the edge of a global apocalypse in the 1962 Missile Crisis <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/ cuban-missile-crisis>.

  B) The dictators’ adulation discourse, images and slogans had to be omnipresent as part of the cults of “personality” and “invincibility” (Derby, 2009; Fiallo, 2018; Wiarda, 1968).  Like Hitler and Mussolini, they self-endowed grandiose titles; for example: “the Nation’s Benefactor” for Trujillo, “Maximum Leader” [literally Führer] for Castro.  At any dance that Trujillo attended, nobody dared to dance until “el jefe” took to the floor for his first merengue song (Mateo, 2017).  When in May, 1960 the elder Castro went fishing with left-wing U.S.-American author Ernest Hemingway (incidentally, shortly before the renowned writer left Cuba for good), Castro’s photograph receiving the best trophy for catching the biggest fish was ubiquitous in the media.(6)  One gathers that part of the official quasi-theological “cult of infallibility” was to promote the subliminal message that even the fish knew what to do for the then prime minister (later un-elected “president”).  New York librarian Ray Suárez has reminded me of the anecdote about Roman Emperor Nero (37 AD–68 AD) who —among other insanities of his greedy ego— had himself declared winner repeatedly in Olympic competitions despite his obviously losing to much younger athletes <https://www. thevintagenews.com/ 2018/08/27/nero-competed-in-the-olympics/>.

  C) The home doors lacking a display of placards stating “Trujillo is the jefe [boss] here,” or “This is your house Fidel” —respectively— were deemed suspect.  Indeed, similar to Stalinist Russia, a gruesome repressive apparatus established pervasive terror.  The Trujillos’ informers were called “caliés;” the Castros created the vicinities’ vigilante Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) that spy on everybody.(7)  Tutored by Communist Germany’s frightening Stasi secret police, CDR members still to date imitate the infamous Wächter blockieren [block custodians] of the National Socialists [Nazis] under Hitler (Gann, 1985), oftentimes involving mob violent “actos de repudio” [repudiation acts] virtually all over Cuba.(8)

  D) Both regimes instituted hegemonic single-party states: the Partido Dominicano in the D.R.; the Partido Comunista in Cuba.  Privileged membership in each was —and still is in Cuba— a sine qua non for meaningful jobs, promotions, slots in educational institutions, and even hospital beds and medications. 

  E) Like so many other dictatorships, symbolic elections were held for Trujillo, but only the approved candidates would appear on the ballot; naturally, they were elected “overwhelmingly.”  There was also a symbolic congress which merely served as a rubber stamp that doubled down in chorus the despot’s orders.  The very same can be said of the Castros Socialist regime.  Recent Cuban exiles in particular tell me that they are shocked to learn how certain naïve foreign academicians and journalists refer to Cuba’s National Assembly as if it were a genuine legislature; but this is a body that meets solely semiannually and largely to hear hate-mongering tirades versus presumed “enemies abroad” <http://www.diariodecuba.com/ cuba/1551128708_44847.html>.

  F) Virtually everybody labored for the “highest leaders” (thus becoming de facto clients) even if relatively limited private sector activities were permitted, though still mostly as a presumed generosity of the “benevolent” rulers.  Since tyrants routinely consider themselves the “charismatic center” of the "new nation," they even act as if people were their personal property: from peasants and workers, to beauty queens, intellectuals, performers, athletes, etc. (Derby, 2009).  Illustratively, when a celebrated Cuban neurosurgeon —and former Communist Party leader— wished to emigrate to Argentina, F. Castro opposed publicly to her receiving an exit visa since, in his view, “her brain belonged to the Revolution” <https://es.wikipedia. org/wiki/ Hilda_Molina>. By his version of the transitive law, that meant that she was virtually his property in his role as the “supreme comandante in charge.”(9)

  G) Both dictatorships assembled sinister international propaganda scaffoldings whose tentacles reached foreign media and universities.  Sometime ago I discovered by accident that one of the universities with which I have been connected had granted Trujillo an honoris causa doctorate in 1942, five years after he sponsored the horrible genocidal massacre of thousands of Haitian nationals on Dominican territory.(10)  Likewise, Socialist Cuba is still often praised in international intellectual and media circles for basically imagined attainments —ultimately fake news— such as in healthcare, notwithstanding incontrovertible evidence to the contrary.(11)

  H) The titular power was passed whimsically from elder to younger brother —to Héctor Trujillo and Raúl Castro, respectively— as each was also gifted the rank of “general” without merit.  Similarly, both dictators handpicked faithful non-kin figurehead titular “presidentes” without elections: Joaquín Balaguer for the D.R.; Miguel Díaz-Canel for Cuba.  In all fairness, Balaguer played a pivotal role in the evolution to today’s Dominican liberal democracy and served subsequently as a legitimately elected (if controversial) president.  But it is doubtful that Díaz-Canel would foster a comparable transition to an open society in Cuba.(12)

V.        OTHER ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 

    There are many more parallels between these two presumed opposite poles dictatorships that deserve future lengthier analyses.  But oddly, in my own long-term research in the D.R., I have met admirers of Trujillismo who argue that “el caudillo” brought stability à la dictator Franco in Spain, which is partially true, but at what human and other cost?

    Likewise, as recently as earlier this year (2019) I met intellectuals in the D.R. who, while professing disdain for dictatorships, advocate for a Castro-type dictatorship for their nation.  Paradoxically, the D.R. is now infinitely more prosperous and a more open society than Socialist Cuba.(13)  These interlocutors’ aversion to totalitarianism seems to be naïvely or ignorantly selective and incongruous.(14)

VI.       CONCLUSION, FOR NOW…  

    In sum, the end result of any tyranny, be it of the so-called Left or Right, is consistently destructive, sadly leaving a trail of death, desaparecidos, prisoners, exiles, refugees, mega-corruption, and socio-economic backwardness.(15)    

    While the “patriarch’s autumn” was over in the D.R. in May/1961, a ruinous, oppressive dictatorship is still haunting Cuba, encompassing also the quotidian time-consuming colas [food-lines].(16)  As it is well-known, foodstuff and most other goods are still rationed in Cuba, typical of command/centralized “economies of scarcity” (vid. Verdery, 1996).  The suffering Cuban people too deserve a regime change to a Popperian Open Society.(17)

   VII.   RESUMEN EN ESPAÑOL:   En este ensayo presento una comparación, aunque muy preliminar, de las características semejantes más obvias de dos de las dictaduras más férreas de la historia de las Américas, ambas en el Caribe hispano insular: (a) la de la familia Trujillo en la República Dominicana (1930-1961);  y (b) la de los hermanos Castro en Cuba (a partir del año 1959).  LLevo ya cuatro décadas y media analizando muy de cerca la cultura y sociedad dominicana (incluyendo estudios de campo extensivo en el país), y las correspondientes a las cubana por más tiempo, aunque más bien a distancia.  Estas dos tiranías antillanas son descritas a menudo en la prensa y la literatura académica foráneas como si fuesen regímenes de polos opuestos.  Sin embargo, como trato de demostrar en los detalles que expongo en el presente trabajo, ambas tienen muchas características en común, sobre todo en sus métodos de control socio-político-económico.  Esta es, precisamente, una cuestión que los apologistas extranjeros del régimen socialista cubano en la prensa, el mundo académico y hasta en Hollywood pretenden negar desde sus cómodas posiciones en ultramar.  Mi “fantasía” académica es la de crear una sub-disciplina dentro de la Antropología Socio-Cultural: la Antropología de las Dictaduras.  Este es un tema sobre el cual he estado escribiendo por años y que pretendo continuar desarrollando.  Por todo esto —y como es mi costumbre— le doy bienvenida a toda crítica constructiva a través de mi dirección electrónica ralum@pitt.edu (ver sección bibliográfica).  R.A.A.

 

VIII.  NOTES

  1)I dedicate this article to the victims of both, the Dominican and the Cuban dictatorships.

  2)  For this article, I borrow freely from previous writings on analogous topics (vid. Alum, various in the bibliography; González & Alum, 2009).  I adapt this version for PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY from my latest article in PANORAMAS (Alum, 2019).  I have been studying the Dominican Republic since early 1975, barely 13.5 years after the Trujillato’s demise; and Cuba for a longer time, if from afar.  My initial Dominican field research was supported by a combination of sources, such as the Fulbright-Hays, the OAS, and the Dominican Fondo Para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales fellowship programs, among others.  I enjoyed affiliation in Santo Domingo mainly with the Museo del Hombre Dominicano, the Instituto de Estudios Aplicados, and the Universidad Nacional Pedro Henríquez Ureña.  I use here the professional style of Anthropology in the text’s citations as well as in the bibliography (with minor modifications for the sake of space economy).  As usual —and particularly for this piece— I welcome all constructive critiques, moreover, since I plan to continue writing about the cross-cultural comparison of dictatorships.

  3)  There are, nonetheless, a few worthy descriptive ethnographies of the now former Old World socialist/communist systems; my favorites are: (a) by Verdery (1996) about Ceaușescu’s dreadful Socialist dictatorship in Romania;  (b) and by Sabloff (2013) on Socialist Mongolia. 

  4)  As Fontova (2013) has deconstructed, it was not a “revolution” per se, but a chiefly bourgeois political rebellion against Batista —Cuba’s sole Afro-Cuban head of state— who in 1952 had staged an unjustified coup d’état vs. the duly elected constitutional government of social-democrat Presidente Carlos Prío.  Indeed, the Castros have given the gloss “revolution” a bad name in Latin-America.  In the words of Azel (2019): “As Cubans and Venezuelans have discovered, ‘revolution’ [for them]…means going around in a circle getting nowhere.” Incidentally, regarding ethnic/racial diversity that the Castros’ apologists claim to be concerned about, Afro-Cubans continue to be under-represented in the governing “Nomenklatura,” as first exposed internationally long ago by Afro-Cuban Pan-Africanist ethnologist Carlos Moore (1989), now exiled in Brazil [see also Note 16].  For a recent outline of the Castros’ biography, see <https://cubanstudiesinstitute.us/este-dia-en-la-historia-de-cuba/nace-fidel-castro-13-de-agosto-de-1926/>.

  5)  I have been writing about Cuba’s “culture of poverty” for decades, articles that were inspired by the researches in Cuba of U.S. anthropologists Oscar Lewis and Douglas Butterworth in 1969-70 (vid. Alum, 2015).  Additionally, see the recent pessimistic analysis of Socialist Cuba —as he calls it— by my former Pittsburgh professor Mesa-Lago, who is deemed “the Dean of Cubanology” <https://www.panoramas. pitt.edu/ economy-and-development/ column-carmelo-mesa-lago-“-legacy-fidel-social-economic-balance-2016> [see also Notes 7 and 15].

  6)  For reminding me of the Hemingway anecdote, I thank my kinsman, UCLA distinguished historian Teófilo Ruiz-Alum, who was Hemingway’s neighbor in the outskirts of Havana <https:// 20thcenturylibrary.com/ 2018/05/04/when-castro-won-a-hemingway-sponsored-fishing-tournament-in-may-1960/>.  A further ludicrous illustration of the cult of personality was provided long ago, if unwittingly, by Jamaican playwright Barry Reckord (1971) —a Castro advocator— who was reported having been told by interviewees while visiting Cuba around 1970 that it was expected that “Fidel had to eat more” than ordinary Cubans since he was “the leader,” as well as taller than the average Cuban.  

  7)  For a mere example of the ubiquitous presence of the Cuban state espionage, see historian Guerra’s (2015) analytic narrative of famous U.S. anthropologist Oscar Lewis’ sad record in Cuba, where he and his research team were spied upon 24/7 and finally expelled from the country.  Hardly mentioned in the à propos literature, however, is the fact that Lewis left behind in jail his Cuban statistician; indeed, I am unaware of any academician outside of Cuba —other than myself— protesting his harsh imprisonment.  After his release from jail, the former aide was able to take exile in the U.S., where I assisted him.  And yet, writing 10 years after their catastrophic experience, Lewis’ widow, Ruth Maslow Lewis, inexplicably dismissed and trivialized their misadventure and did not recount the whole story accurately (cf. Alum, 2015) [see also Notes 5  and 15].

  8)  See <http://cubademocraciayvida.org/ web/ article.asp?artID=28217> for a description of the dangerous “repudiation acts” in Cuba.  Incidentally, unsurprisingly, the equally dynastic dictatorship of the Duvaliers in Haiti (1957-1986) created its own version of vigilantes and agent provocateurs: the Tontons Macoutes.  Curiously, in his book about 15 Latin-American dictatorships in the XX century, Galván (2012), while correctly including Trujillo, omits the Castros totally.  Likewise, he as well as Wikipedia and other reference tools call the Duvaliers a “dynasty” —and again, rightly so— but not so vis-á-vis the longer-in-power Castros <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duvalier_ dynasty>.  

  9)  Although the exit visa was eventually granted to the physician thanks to international pressure, F. Castro uttered similar comments again later on upon learning of the defection abroad of yet other doctors as well as several athletes <https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v= aGl2hwdLKQk>. 

  10)  As of this writing (August/2019), I have yet to succeed in my petitioning efforts with such U.S. institution of higher learning to rescind that reprehensible honorary degree to Trujillo. 

  11) In reality, Cuba’s statist healthcare is substandard and —ironically— fundamentally dependent on generous care-packages from the government’s exiled victims, i.e., the same expatriates relentlessly maligned by Havana’s hate-mongering propaganda (see ethnologist Hirschfeld’s magnificent book on Socialist Cuba’s healthcare [2007], which I reviewed in both, English and Spanish <https://www.clublibertaddigital. com/ ilustracion-liberal/40/la-antropologia-politica-de-la-antropologia -medica-cubana-alexander-l-alum-y-rolando-alum-liner.html>; see also the more recent Comas & González (2014) volume by two Cuban physicians.

  12)  These are only two glaring examples of high-level nepotism/cronyism, a practice that —paradoxically— the Castros had promised to eliminate as belonging to the ancient regime.  Irrespective, it is appropriate to refer to the Trujillos’ and the Castros’ dictatorships in plural each, regardless of who holds the presidential title.  After all, Rafael Trujillo and near nonagenarian Raúl Castro (1931-- ) each remained the real power as head of their respective political parties and in command of the armed forces, reminiscent of the situation of rough military dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1990s Chile (see also Note 17).

  13)  In my most recent visit to the D.R. (April-May/2019), I delivered a presentation —regarding my 45 years researching Dominican culture/society— at the Annual Feria del Libro/Book Fair, where I met Presidente Danilo Medina (I have already by now conversed with all post-Trujillo elected Dominican presidents). 

  14)  I often hear ill-informed foreign academicians and journalists doubting the unpopularity of Socialist Cuba’s less-than-1% self-perpetuating governing elite (by the way, composed mainly of European-descent, aging males).  The “doubters” point out to the frequent Fascist-style pro-regime mass rallies in Havana as if it were a sign of popular support.  In the same vein, my mostly elderly Dominican interviewees have recounted that up to the week-end before Trujillo’s death at 10:00 pm on Wednesday, May 30,1961, there were recurrent orchestrated parades cheering for the dictator along the capital city of Santo Domingo’s picturesque ocean-drive Malecón (and I have seen relevant historical photos too). 

  15) Pre-Socialist Cuba was considered the world’s largest producer of cane-sugar, but my Cuban informants in the U.S. and the D.R. have been telling me for years that even sugar had to be purchased by ordinary Cubans through the degrading ration card as relatively early in the regime as at least the late 1960s, if not earlier.  I am now corroborating such tales with the narrative of an extraordinarily revealing article by Lillian Guerra (2015).  She was able to examine Oscar Lewis’ research field notes gathered in Cuba that are now archived with the University of Southern Illinois.  These documents confirm, among other things, that in 1969 —i.e., long before the so-called Special Period that began after the collapse of the Soviet bloc— even sugar was rationed.  Interestingly, Lewis’ informants complained that food rationing did not fully apply to the privileged Nomenklatura members (see also Notes 5 and 7; Alum, 2014).

  16)  Cubans also face the continual menace of paredones [firing squads] and other kinds of systematic state terror.  It is well documented that by orders of Argentinian-born “Che” Guevara, the government operated in the 1960s Soviet-modeled gulags (called UMAP camps) to extract forced-labor especially from gays, as well as dissidents of all kinds, including intellectuals, would-be emigrants, the unemployed, Beatles’ fans, long-haired hippies, disgruntled farmers, social-democrats, Trotskyites, Freemasons, and religious individuals, notably Jehovah’s Witnesses and Afro-Cuban folk-cult practitioners (Moore, 1989; Núñez, et al., 1985; Ros, 2004).  I have interviewed several former inmates from the various camps who suffered real life horror stories.  Among them was famed writer Reinaldo Arenas (1992), who spoke to my students in fall/1980 when I was teaching at Empire State College in Manhattan (<https://biography.jrank. org/pages/3783/Arenas-Reinaldo-1943-1990-Cuban-Writer.html>; vid. also the film “Mauvaise Conduite” <www.imdb.com/ title/ tt0087696/>, inter alia). 

  17)  As I was completing this writing, I received separate communications from the prolific Dominican intellectual Adriano Tejada and the Florida-based politologist Alfred Cuzán, both of whom have been independently engaged in the comparative study of dictatorships, though from different perspectives.  Inspired by the XVI century French philosopher Étienne de La Boétie’s concept of “voluntary submission,” Tejada ingeniously draws parallels between the rule of the Trujillos with that of Franco in Spain (Personal Communication; Pereyra, 2019).  But his interest inquires more into why people resign themselves to tolerate dictatorships.  Cuzán (2018), on the other hand, contrasts the “results” —i.e., statistical indexes vis-à-vis especially a progressive quality of life— principally of the dictatorships of the Castros with those of Franco and Pinochet (incidentally, on balance, the Castros’ six-decade rule results in negative conclusions).  Both authors present food for thought disparities that are highly useful for more comprehensive cross-national and diachronic analyses beyond my scope here.

 

IX.  ADDITIONAL  BIBLIOGRAPHIC  REFERENCES

Arenas, R., 1992, ANTES QUE ANOCHEZCA. Tusquets.

Azel, J., 2019, “An anti-Revolutionary party for Cuba and Venezuela,” PanAm Post                    [March 11/2019].

Alum, R., 1982, "Dominican Republic/República Dominicana," In: CURRENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEVELOPING NATIONS. McGraw-Hill.

  ---, 1984, "The Dominican example," Wall Street Journal; April 13/1984.

  ---, 1987, “Dominican Republic,” In: WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS & PARTIES.  Facts-on-File (2nd edition).

  ---, 2011, “50 years after Trujillo’s deathDominican Republic thrives as Cuba languishes,” Miami Herald; May 29/2011.  

  ---, 2014, “Antes del 'Período Especial', ¿utopía o distopía?,” Diario de Cuba; Jan. 1/2014<http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/1388441736_6521.html>.

  ---, 2015, “The Cuban culture of poverty conundrum,” Panoramas (Univ. of Pittsburgh); Feb.14/2015 <https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-politics/cuban-culture-poverty-conundrum>.

  ---, 2019, “Some parallels of two Caribbean Dictatorships,” Panoramas; June 26/2019.

Comas, J.; & L. González, 2014, CUBA: MEDICINA Y REVOLUCIÓN—RADIOGRAFíA DE UN MITO. Eriginal.

Cuzán, A., 2018, “Evaluating Castro’s Cuba, Franco’s Spain and Pinochet’s Chile—Economic, social and political indicators.”  Unpublished typescript presented at the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy’s annual meeting (Miami, July/2018; courtesy of the author).   

de la Cuesta, L; & R. Alum, eds., 1974, CONSTITUCIONES CUBANAS. Iberama.

Derby, L., 2009, THE DICTATOR'S SEDUCTION—POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN THE ERA OF TRUJILLO. Duke Univ. Press.

Fiallo, F., 2018, “De la Feria de Trujillo a la Cumbre de los Castro,” Diario de Cuba;                   Feb. 3/2014.

Fontova, H., 2013, THE LONGEST ROMANCE—MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND FIDEL CASTRO.  Encounter.

Galván, J.; 2012, LATIN-AMERICAN DICTATORS OF THE 20th CENTURY. McFarland.

Gann, L., 1985, “Adolf Hitler—The Complete Totalitarian,” The Intercollegiate Review;Fall/1985:23-30.

González, D.; & R. Alum, 2009, “La Seducción del dictador,” El Caribe (D.R.); Nov. 13/2009.

Guerra, L., 2015, “Former slum dwellers, the Communist Youth, and the Lewis Project in Cuba, 1969-71,” Cuban Studies (Univ. of Pittsburgh), 43:67-89.

Hamill, H., 1965, DICTATORSHIP IN SPANISH-AMERICA. Knopf.

Hansen, J., 2019, YOUNG CASTRO—THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY. Simon & Schuster.

Hirschfeld, K., 2007, HEALTH, POLITICS AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA. Transaction.

Hollander, P., 1997, POLITICAL PILGRIMS. Transaction.

Lewis, P., 2006, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN LATIN-AMERICA. Rowman-Littlefield.

Mateo, A., 2017, “Bailando con Trujillo,” AlmonteMomento.Net; Jun. 22/2017 

<https://almomento.net/opinion-bailando-con-trujillo-2/>.

 

Moore, C.; 1989, CASTRO, THE BLACKS AND AFRICA. Univ. of California-Los Angeles, Center for African-American Studies.

 

Núñez, R.; R. Alum; & R. Nodal, 1985, "The Afro-Hispanic Abakuá," Orbis--Linguistique                       [Louvain], XXXI(1-2):263-284.  

Pereyra, E., 2019, “Analogías y diferencias entre dictaduras de Franco y Trujillo—sobre A. Tejada y P. Cernuda,” Diario Libre [Sto. Dom.]; June 9/2019.

Portes, A; & A. Armony, 2018, THE GLOBAL EDGE—MIAMI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Univ. of California Press.

Reckord, B., 1971, DOES FIDEL EAT MORE THAN YOUR FATHER? Praeger.

Ros, E., 2004, LA UMAP—EL GULAG CASTRISTA. Universal.

Sabloff, P., 2013, DOES EVERYONE WANT DEMOCRACY?—INSIGHTS FROM MONGOLIA.  Routledge. 

Vargas-LLosa, M, 2000, LA FIESTA DEL CHIVO. Alfaguara.

Verdery, K., 1996, WHAT WAS SOCIALISM? Princeton Univ. Press.

Wiarda, H.,1968, DICTATORSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT—THE METHODS OF CONTROL IN TRUJILLO’S DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Univ. of Florida Press.

 

XI. ABOUT THE AUTHOR:  Professor Roland Armando Alum  is a New Jersey-based external, senior Research Associate with the Univ. of Pittsburgh’s Center for Latin American Studies, from which he graduated; he also received a Post-Doctoral Certificate from the Univ. of Virginia.  He is a Fellow of the Society for Applied Anthropology, a trustee of DeVry Univ.-N.J., and vice-chairman of both: the N.J. Certified Psychoanalysts Committee and the N.J. Center for Hispanic Policy, Research & Development.  He has taught and served as an administrator at several colleges/universities in the D.R., Puerto Rico and the continental U.S., culminating in a Distinguished Professorship at William Paterson Univ. (N.J.).  Additionally, he has held sub-cabinet level posts in the Federal and the N.J. State Governments, aside from other numerous pro bono positions on boards and commissions.  His over 150 writings on diverse topics —in English & Spanish— have been published in encyclopedias, books, international scholarly journals, and U.S. and foreign newspapers [ralum@pitt.edu].

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